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ABSTRACT 
There is $2.3 Billion riding on the answer to a very .. 
critical question in the Virginia Telephone Industry. The 
question concerns who should pay for the embedded investment in 
jointly used wire and equipment con~ecting telephone custom~rs t~ 1 
switching off ices. This plant, many argue, is needed for ac~ess· 
to the local and long distance network regardless of whether;a 
call is made. 
Answering this question is a two step process. First these,' 
''-' ~ 
costs must be allocated to the proper jurisdiction (intrastate or. 
' ' ' 
interstate) and the proper class of service (toll or local) 
within the jurisdiction. Second the costs must be recovered from 
customers (local customers, long distance customers, and ;',,'·.', 
l 
interexchange carriers). In the days before long distance_ 
competition, a large portion of these costs were allocated t<;>:;,and ·. 
recovered from toll so local rates were kept affordable. 
Competitive pressures and changes in the industry are:forc~ng 
this practice to cease. There is no consenus'and a ~ar~e ~~~ree 
of controversy over the new allocation and recovery ~ro6es~." 
' ' 
In Virginia, existing recovery is based on'inte~im~ 
·''',' 
guidelines. A more permanent policy and direction is .. needed on 
,' ~ . ,• '· 
recovering these jointly used faci 1 i ties. This Jresearch·: was 
designed to aid in developing poi lcy and direct'ion. Maior 
findings include: 
o All customers who use a service (including long distatice 
companies who get local exchange ac6ess) should'pay f6r 
the joint facilities used in furnistiing that service. 
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o The two most logical allocation and recovery 
methodologies are 
usage based and 
stand alone 
o Optimum allocation and recovery should be determined by 
competitive market conditions within a range bounded by 
stand alone at one end and usage at the other. The 
competition in this case is bypass.·· ··., 
,' \,' 
o A more appropriate and more narrow range would be .. ·, 
bounded by existing recovery at one extreme and usage 
based recovery with a 25% interstate (stand alone) .. ,_ 
allocation at the other. This is a usage-stand alori~ 
hybrid that combines advantages of both approaches~- · 
o Moving from present recovery to the usage-stand al6ne .. 
hybrid would (based on nationwide data) shift about' 
$4.70 in revenue requirements per line per month to end 
users. Of the $4.70, approximately $2.10 would be a 
federal Subscriber Line Charge increase. Local rates : 
would only have to absorb about $2.60. Recovery from 
long distance companies would decrease nearly 60% ($6.S 
Billion). The carrier common line charge would fall 
from 4.33 cents per minute to roughly 1.9 cents. ,- 1 
o Recovery from long distance companies should promote 
usage (preferably in off peak periods). This would be 
in the form of a flat rate "rent,• or a usage based 
recovery with volume or tapered discounts.· The present 
uniform usage recovery (carr~er common line~.charge) has 
no incentive to stimulate usage. - ~~~~ 
vi 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
Was the telephone network built to carry l.ocal calls or hong. 
·,' ' 
distance calls? This fundamental question has remained~ 
,«• ' 
'•/. 
unanswered for decades. Today, local calling prices are.going up; 
and long distance rates are declining. Part of .the reason ha~ ~o~ 
·_i,,' 
do with that answer. A war is raging over that 'issue between· the. 
;, " '..'. ._, ') ' 
r '\ ··r 
telephone industry, federal regulators, and state regulators~ 
, '.:'1 ',·'\(,' ' •' ;« 
Federal regulators have their answer. The long d~stance, 
telephone companies have theirs, and the local .. companies.have, 
'. . ' . >~ ., 
theirs. State regulators are caught in the middle. :, Iri thfs 
' ,'.· 
paper, I will examine that question, and answer ~it fr~m~the 
perspective of a Virginia regulator. 
There is a huge investment in telephone plant and equipment· 
' 't ' ' 't ~ ' 
that goes from the telephone company's switching ~ffice· to each 
customer's premise. It is commonly called the•local foop, and' 
was installed at the local telephone c6mpanies' expense. In 
Virginia, it exceeds $2.3 Billion. Many argue it is ne~d~d 
regardless of whether a call is made, and thus.is considered;non-. 
traffic sensitive (NTS) or fixed plant. This same plant is. u'~ed 
'\. '";' . . ' ' 
to make a local call or a long distance call • .' Also, the same 
line is used to make calls between states (int~~s~ate) or calls 
within a state (intrastate). 
Traditionally, the Federal Communications~Commission (FCC) 
set rates for interstate toll calls, and state commissions set 
rates for intrastate toll as well as local calls. At i~sue·~~~ 
how much· of the cost of the loca 1 loop should be charged to 
interstate long distance, how much to intrastate long distance, 
and how much to local. 
Historically, less than 10 percent of all calls (local and: 
toll) were interstate, but nearly 30 percent of the costs were. 
allocated there. Substantial portions of the costs were also 
allocated to intrastate toll. This meant local loop costs for. 
local calling could be kept down. In effect, a profit. 
contribution from toll went to keep local service afford~ble. 
Thus, the price of a long distance or a local call bore.no 
relation to the actual cost of providing it. 
Overpricing toll to subsidize local worked fine in.the . 1 
monopoly days when the telephone industry was a partnership 
~:. ; 
the Bell System and the 1500 or so independent companies. That 
partnership crumbled when competition was allowed in t~e long 
distance market, and when the Bell System was broken up. 
competition, the concept of sharing revenues vanish~d, .a,nd the 
need for rates based on economic costs has moved to~the · 
•>'> 
forefront. In addition, technology has advanced to 0 th~~~~int. 
that it is becoming increasingly affordable to build priv~~e ·· 
~ ' . t 
networks which bypass portions, if not all, of _the: public 
network. 
The result of al 1 this leaves state regulators .:in a di lemma. 
,, .' ' I, 
The problem is determining how to pay for the fixed costs.of 
jointly used local networks while toll competition~gro~s ~~d. 
there is already upward pressure on local rates. The traditional 
method of cost and revenue allocations is being overhauled. Long 
distance companies are now paying local companies for the 
? 
privilege of accessing the local network (or for the customers' 
privilege of accessing the long distance network, depending from 
whose perspective one looks.) These payments are called access 
charges, and a portion is currently targeted to pay for fixed 
local loop costs. This, according to the FCC, is a temporary 
solution. The problem remains: who should pay for these ~f,ixed 
costs? 
Objectives 
First we must decide how much of the local loop costs· should; 
be allocated to the joint services that use it. Second we must 
determine how much the long distance companies should pay the 
local companies for having access to that network. Third,'we 
. \>',. 
must decide how much customers should pay towards recovering that' 
' ; i 
fixed network. And finally, we should define how the ,rec.o~ery. 
should be structured. 
The objective of this investigation is to answer :,tnese , •·· 
. ,l.,. 1·,,:.,·,, 
questions and propose a NTS local loop recovery plan which is: 
1. Simple and easy to administer. 
2. Easy for customers to understand. 
3. Fair to customers, local telephone companies', 'andrlong' 
distance companies. 
4. A deterrent to uneconomic bypass. 
Significance 
The Virginia State Corporation Commission began 
investigating access charges in 1983. That coincided with the• 
.. , 
overhaul at the Federal level. Companies in Virginia have been 
operating under interim guidelines since then. The Commission 
permitted them to file their own tariffs to recover NTS costs. 
These filings, for the most part, mirrored FCC tariffs. 
The significance of this research is to develop a specific 
strategy and plan for the Commission to consider for recovering 
NTS costs in Virginia. If adopted, interim guidelines may be 
replaced with more permanent Virginia specific procedures for 
allocating and recovering local loop costs. 
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
General 
The history of this problem may be divided into two broad 
time periods: (1) before divestiture and (2) after divestiture. 
Divestiture, of course, was the unprecedented breakup of the Bell 
System on January 1, 1984 as part of the Consent Decree (Modified 
Final Judgment) between the Justice Department and American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). Under the settlement, 
AT&T agreed to give up ownership of its local telephone 
companies. It kept, among other things, its long distance 
business, its research arm (formerly known as Bell Labs), and its 
equipment manufacturing arm (known then as Western Electric). 
From this breakup came the concept of access char_ges. Prior to 
this, sharing toll revenues was done through a process known as 
separations, settlements, and division of revenues. The 
divestiture is significant because it was the end of the pre-
competition era of revenue sharing (settlements and division of 
revenues), and the beginning of the post-competition era (access 
charges). Although toll competition was allowed years earlier, 
the cost allocation and revenue sharing procedures had not been 
revised to reflect it. 
The telephone industry had evolved as a partnership of one 
national long distance company (AT&T Long Lines), 22 local Bell 
Operating Companies (BOCs) owned by AT&T, and several thousand 
independent local companies (independent in the sense they were 
not part of the Bell System). Most interstate long distance 
(toll) service was provided by AT&T Long Lines. Local service 
and most intrastate toll was furnished by the local companies. 
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For many calls, equipment owned by all of these was used, and a 
method to compensate each was needed. Since much of the plant 
could be used jointly for local and long distance, a cost 
allocation method was necessary to determine how much of the 
joint plant should be allocated to interstate toll, intrastate 
toll, and local. This cost allocation process was called 
separations. Once the allocation was done, a method was needed 
to divide the toll revenues. This cost recovery process was 
called settlements and division of revenues. Settlements was the 
process of sharing revenues with the independent companies, and 
division of revenues was AT&T's reimbursement to the BOCs. All 
interstate toll revenues were pooled with AT&T and later 
apportioned to the independents and BOCs based on their relative 
costs determined through separations studies. The BOCs acted as 
the clearing house for intrastate toll. 
Underlying Factors 
In the pre-divestiture days, there were two underlying 
factors that shaped separations and settlements policy. First 
was the controversy over two philosophically opposite separations 
approaches: (1) the Board-to-Board Theory and (2) the Station-
to-Station Theory. Second was the phenomenon known as toll rate 
disparity. 
The Board-to-Board principle came first. In calculating 
toll costs, it considered only the equipment investment between 
and including the originating and terminating toll switchboards. 
All local exchange plant, including the local switchboard and 
local loop, was excluded. The practical effect of this was toll 
assumed none of costs of the jointly used exchange plant. All 
was assigned to local and recovered through local rates. 
The Station-to-Station theory evolved later, and included 
the plant from the originating station (telephone set) to the 
terminating station in calculating toll costs. Thus, a portion 
of the jointly used exchange plant was assigned to toll, and 
exchange rates were relieved of this burden. I will discuss in 
more detail later how these two philosophies evolved in the 
separations process. 
The second underlying shaper of separations and settlements 
was the toll rate disparity problem. Simply put, this is the 
difference in intrastate and interstate toll rates. It had 
several causes. Primarily, it resulted from the dual regulatory 
process in the United States where the FCC regulated interstate 
toll and the state public utility commissions regulated 
intrastate toll. Since the board-to-board method assigned all 
local exchange costs to the state jurisdiction, interstate toll 
was allocated none of these costs. This made interstate toll 
proportionally less expensive. In addition, advances in 
technology saw unit costs fall for long haul toll, whereas costs 
for short haul toll and local service stayed about the same. 
Most long haul toll is interstate and shorthaul toll is 
intrastate. Therefore, these economies enabaled interstate toll 
rates to be reduced over the years to the point that intrastate 
rates for calls of similar distances were significantly higher. 
Separations changes over the years reduced this disparity. 
1910 - 1930 Period 
The history of separations has roots to the early 1900's. 
' In a 1913 Minnesota Rate Case (Simpson, et al. v. Sheppard, 230 
US 352), the u.s. Supreme Court examined railroad property 
investment that had been allocated based on revenues. It found: 
"It would seem necessary to find a basis for total value of the 
property independently of revenue and this must be found in the 
use made of the property."(!) Thus, it said usage instead of 
revenue should be used to allocate property. The second 
applicable court decision was even more significant. It applied 
specifically to telephone cost allocations. In 1930, the Supreme 
Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, (282 u.s. 133) 
held: 
••• While the difficulty in making an exact 
apportionment of the property is apparent, and extreme 
nicety is not required, only reasonable measures being 
essential ••• it is quite another matter to ignore 
altogether the actual uses to which the property is 
put. It is obvious that, unless an apportionment is 
made, the intrastate service to which the exchange 
property is allocated will bear an undue burden •••• (2) 
In effect, the Court adopted the station-to-station basis of 
separation. However, AT&T did not rush to implement the Court's 
decision: 
The station-to-station theory of ratemaking was not 
accepted fully by the Bell System until 1943 with 
respect to interstate toll services, and in its 
intrastate toll services not u~jil 1950, when the 
company amended those tariffs. ) 
At any rate, the period of 1910 through 1930 saw little interest 
in separations outside of these two court decisions. The state 
regulatory commissions as well as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (which had interstate communications regulatory 
responsibility at the time) paid little, if any, attention to 
separations matters. 
1930 - 1945 Period 
The creation of the FCC in 1934 changed that however. Since 
AT&T profits were excessive, the FCC initiated a long series of 
AT&T voluntary interstate rate reductions. For example, between 
1935 and 1940 several rate reductions took place which 
cumulatively totaled $95 million. In 1941, over objections of 
state regulators, another $14 million reduction occured. A $50 
million reduction came in 1943, $8 million in 1944, and $21 and 
$16 million in 1945.<4> These reductions were not duplicated at 
the state level, and the toll rate disparity problem began 
growing into a serious issue. 
In 1941, the first formal investigation of separations was 
initiated by the FCC (Docket 6328). This came after urging by 
the Bell System and the National Association of Railroad and 
Utility Commissioners (NARUC; now called the National Association 
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners). Incidentally, and 
ironically, and this docket remained open for 25 years without a 
decision. The primary issue was the board-to-board versus 
station-to-station allocation principle. 
A major breakthrough came in 1943 when the Bell System filed 
interstate tariffs using on the station-to-station principle: 
This reversal, following the adamant stand taken [by 
AT&T] the previous year, appears to be evidence of 
recognition by the Bell System of the two-fold 
character of separations and methods: the formal 
character, as precription for allocating property, 
revenues, and expenses to the jurisdiction; the 
political ~haracter governing the direction of costs 
and rates.{S) 
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Post War Era 
Separations in the post-war era was influenced primarily 
through politically charged negotiation and compromise between 
the FCC, NARUC, and the Bell System. There were several 
highlights. First, the concept of proportionate usage (state 
verus interstate) was accepted as an appropriate allocation 
methodology. Second, the first Separations Manual was developed 
in 1947 as a joint effort of NARUC and the FCC. Third there was 
increasing pressure on state regulators to increase local rates, 
and the toll rate disparity problem grew. Hence, the states 
looked more and more to the interstate jurisdiction as a haven to 
shift costs. A series of changes (highlighted in Table l) 
transferred increasingly more costs to interstate. 
Year 
1947 
1952 
1956 
1962 
1965 
1969 
1971 
Table 1 
Separations Changes: 1947 - 1911< 6> 
Change 
Simplification in Methods 
Charleston Plan 
Modified Phoenix Plan 
Simplification in Methods 
Denver Plan 
FCC Plan 
Ozark Plan 
Increased Allocation to 
Interstate (as % of Total 
Revenues) 
2.9% 
3.7% 
3.2% 
2.3% 
4.6% 
2.2% 
2.2% 
Unfortunately, states were not able to (or elected not to} 
take advantage of these shifts, and very few lowered toll rates. 
AT&T found itself in the anomalous position being able to absorb 
the increased costs while continuing interstate rate reductions. 
The demand elasticity for toll calling stimulated usage, and the 
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rate reductions were offset by increased volumes so total 
revenues actually increased. This continued into the 1960's and 
early 1970's when an entirely new force emerged. That was 
competition. 
Competition 
Suddenly, through a series of court and FCC decisions, AT&T 
found it had competitors such as MCI and Sprint in the long 
distance market. In addition, the local companies, both Bell and 
independent, found they had long distance companies other than 
AT&T asking for access to their networks to reach potential toll 
customers. In effect, the long time partnership ceased to exist 
because these new competitors were not part of, and by nature 
could not be a part of the traditional pooling process. These 
companies, called OCCs or Other (than AT&T) Common Carriers, 
argued they should not be required to pay the same as AT&T for 
access to local companies since their connections were inferior 
to AT&T's. (AT&T customers could make a call by dialing, at 
most, 11 digits while OCC customers had to dial up to 23 digits.) 
The OCCs said they should only pay the going business line rate, 
since that was the facility they used to access the local 
network. Thus, this nightmare was superimposed on the already 
controversial question of state versus interstate cost 
allocations. 
The FCC made a somewhat futile attempt to resolve it by 
approving ENFIA tariffs (Exchange Network Facility for Interstate 
Access). These gave the OCCs access to local networks at rates 
that were roughly 35% of AT&T's. ENFIA tariffs and ensuing 
negotiations were extremely controversial. 
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Divestiture 
Fortunately, (or unfortunately to some), the divestiture 
preempted ENFIA by ordering BOCs to •offer to all interexchange 
carriers exchange access on an unbundled, tariffed basis, that is 
equal in type and quality to that provided for ••• AT&T •••• •< 7> 
Further, the court ordered the BOCs to file tariffs for exchange 
access to all carriers, and said these tariffs would take the 
place of the division of revenues process. 
From the MFJ came three fundamental concepts that are 
paramount to today's industry structure. First, all BOCs were 
ordered to provide •equal access,• and they are now modifying 
their switching offices to do this. Second, geographic 
boundaries were drawn· to define the difference between exchange 
communications and interexchange communications. These somewhat 
arbitrary boundaries are called LATAs (Local Access and Transport 
Areas). BOCs may provide service only within a LATA, and are 
prohibited from providing service between them. The rxcs 
(interexchange carriers which include OCCs plus AT&T) primarily 
offer service between LATAs, but are not prohibited by the MFJ 
from serving within them. This is under state jurisdiction, and 
many states (Virginia included) do not yet permit intraLATA 
competition. Third, the BOCs were ordered to file exchange 
access tariffs. 
Following the MFJ, the FCC developed an access charge plan 
which applied to all local exchange companies (LECs) and all 
interexchange companies. This plan, which will be discussed in 
the next section, was only for interstate access, and the states 
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were free· to develop their own plans. State plans were needed 
both for intrastate, interLATA access, and for intrastate, 
intraLATA access. 
The FCC Access Charge Plan 
The FCC isstied its original access charge plan on February 
28, 1983 in its Third Report and Order in Docket 78-72. 
Interestingly, it did not att~mpt to change existing cost 
allocation or separation procedures. These are outlined in Part 
67 of the FCC's Rules and Regulations. Part 67 was adopted from 
the NARUC-FCC Separations Manual. In concurrent proceedings, the 
FCC addressed the separations issue by: (1) freezing the 
Subscriber Plant Factor (interstate allocation percentage) as of 
December 31, 1983 at an average of approximately 28%, and (2) 
replacing the frozen SPF by a uniform 25% gross assignment factor 
that is to be phased in over eight years starting in 1986. Thus, 
ultimately 25% of fixed local exchange costs will be allocated to 
the interstate jurisdiction. 
The FCC's plan deals specifically with cost recovery 
(formerly known as settlements and division of revenues) instead 
of cost allocations. It is detailed in Part 69 of its Rules and 
Regulations. The plan has eleven specific charges or elements 
that are designed to compensate local exchange companies for 
providing access to interexchange companies. 
We are concerned only with the ones that recover the non-
traffic sensitive loop costs. There are two, and they are called 
the carrier common line charge (CCLC) and the subscriber line 
charge (SLC; originally known as the customer access line charge 
or CALC). The basic premise and ultimate goal of the FCC's NTS 
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cost recovery plan is that most of these costs should no longer 
be recovered from long distance revenues. Instead, they should 
be recovered through monthly flat rates charged by local 
companies to all customers. In effect, the FC~ side-stepped the 
sensitive cost allocation issue by allowing 25% of these costs to 
continue being allocated to interstate. However, by assigning 
all of the cost recovery to local instead of long distance 
customers, it has deviously accomplished the same result that 
would have occurred had it not assigned~ of these costs to the 
interstate jurisdiction. 
As a transition, the FCC is gradually shifting the cost 
recovery to local customers. The vehicle is the SLC access 
element. The interexchange carriers are temporarily paying the 
rest in usage based (per minute of use) payments to the lo~al 
companies. This is the CCLC element. In theory, under the FCC's 
plan, as the CCLC goes down over time, the SLC will increase 
until ultimately the CCLC will approach zero and all loop costs 
will be recovered through SLCs. (The ultimate CCLC will be a 
nominal amount to pay for a Universal Service Fund which is a 
subsidy to high cost companies.) 
Another important feature of the FCC's plan is the pooling 
arrangement for the CCLC. Participation is mandatory. 
Theoretically, all interstate CCLC payments made by long 
distance companies go into a pool. The local companies merely 
act as a conduit to channel the funds into the pool. (In 
reality, only the cash flow of revenues netted against costs goes 
into the pool.) The pool is administered by the National 
14 
Exchange Carrier Association (NECA), and funds are apportioned to 
each company according to its costs. The CCLC rate filed by NECA 
is uniform nationwide. A primary goal of the pool is to keep 
toll rates from being geographically deaveraged. 
According to the FCC, an ideal access charge plan would: 
(1) Promote Efficiency: The FCC argued that it is 
economically inefficient to charge customers based on 
usage for plant costs that do not vary with the amount 
of usage. It said the marginal cost of using the local 
loop was zero. Therefore, the price charged to 
interexchange carriers should also be zero. 
(2) Eliminate Discrimination: The FCC contended that 
customers making few long distance calls did not make 
payments that would cover their fixed costs, whereas 
customers making a large volume of calls made payments 
that were in excess of their costs. Also, the same 
facilities were used for different services at 
different prices. In some cases, different prices were 
charged for essentially the same services. This, to 
the FCC, was illegal discrimination. 
(3) Discourage Uneconomic Bypass: Customers may elect to 
use ways of making telephone calls other than the 
traditional telephone switched network. This is known 
as bypass. If prices are based on costs, and a 
customer finds and uses a less expensive alternative 
(such as constructing its own network), we have 
economic bypass. That is what competition is all 
about. However, if a service is priced artificially or 
arbitrarily high and the customer goes elsewhere, we 
have uneconomic bypass. The latter is inefficient, and 
the FCC wants to minimize it. 
(4) Preserve Universal Service: A goal of the telephone 
industry for decades has been to make basic service 
available and affordable to anyone who wants it. The 
danger of uneconomic bypass is that the large and most 
profitable customers will leave the network. The 
remaining smaller customers would then be faced with 
large rate increases to make up the contribution of the 
departed large users. As rates go higher, more 
customers are forced to leave the network. This 
snowball effect puts the local companies into what is 
described by some as a •death spiral•. 
These are noble goals. The FCC's plan has been praised by 
some and criticized by many. It is scheduled to be reviewed 
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later this year. In the meantime, it is the roadmap that all 
must follow in the interstate arena. The intrastate arena, 
however, is the focus of this research. 
Status in Virginia 
The divestiture and the FCC's access charge plan caused the 
Virginia Commission in 1983 to begin an investigation into 
providing intrastate of toll service (Case No. PUC830020). 
Traditional toll settlement agreements ended on December 31, 
1983, and the Commission needed a replacement. In its Interim 
Order of December 23, 1983, the Commission ordered access tariffs 
for Virginia LECs which were, with one exception, mirror images 
of their FCC tariffs. They applied for interLATA and intraLATA 
access. 
For interLATA calls the local company bills the end user 
for, and turns the revenues over to the long distance company. 
(Some long distance companies bill directly.) The local comapny 
concurrently bills the long distance company access for 
originating and/or terminating the call, and keeps the access 
revenues. There is no intrastate pool similar to the interstate 
national pool. It is strictly an access "bill and keep" 
arrangement using, for the most part, tariffs that are mirror 
images of FCC approved interstate tariffs. 
In addition, an originating responsibility plan (ORP) was 
implemented for intraLATA access. Competition in the intraLATA 
market is currently prohibited. Therefore, local companies 
provide intraLATA toll service on a regulated monopoly basis 
similar to local service. There are no interexchange carriers 
(with the exception of incidental calling for which the IXCs 
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reimburse the LECs). Under the ORP, the originating company 
bills the customer and keeps the revenue. If a different company 
completes the call, it is paid terminating access charges by the 
originating coi:npany. 
All access tariffs were ordered on an interim basis. A 
subsequent order on November 30, 1984 allowed revisions, again on 
an interim basis. This order was significant because the 
Commission stated on page 2: 
However, the Commission is of the opinion that the 
•mirroring• of interstate access charges is only a 
temporary phenomenon bridging the transition from toll 
settlements to cost-based access charges. While each 
local exchange carrier may not now have its Virginia 
specific costs, Virginia companies, individually or 
collectively, should develop costs related to Virginia 
expenses and investments rather than relying upon costs 
developed natio~g11y for application to interstate 
cornrnunications.l ) 
Nevertheless, mirroring has continued and Virginia specific costs 
have not been developed. Current access tariffs continue to 
survive on an interim basis. 
Conclusion 
In examining the history of settlements, separations, and 
access charges, several things are apparent. This discipline is 
complex, arcane, politically charged, evolutionary, and has no 
hope of ever reaching an ultimate answer or method upon which all 
can agree. One authority described it this way: 
Telephone separations is a process of cost allocations. 
It is inherently an arbitrary process in that no 
absolute correctness or incorrectness can be attributed 
to the premises which underlie its principles. It all 
depends on where you wc,.~t to go and what objectives you 
are trying to achieve. l ) 
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As Supreme Court Justice Douglas described it in 1945: 
A separation of properties is merely a step in the 
determination of costs properly allocable to the 
various classes of services rendered by a utility. But 
where as here several classes of services have a common 
use of the same property, difficulties of separation are 
obvi.ous. Allocation of costs is not a matter for the 
slide-rule. It involves judgment on a myriad of facts. 
It has no claim to exact science.ClO) 
The primary goal, therefore, would appear to be to continue 
finding interim and arbitrary solutions that best appease the 
many interests of the involved parties. 
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METHODS OF STUDY 
The approach of this study is both theoretical and 
practical. First I will seek a solution from a purely 
theoretical accounting, economic, and engineering approach. Next 
I will examine the practical effects of this solution. Industry 
and state specific data is used to aid in the theoretical and 
practical examination. 
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DISCUSSION 
Cost Allocation 
As pointed out under the Objectives section, the first 
question to answer concerns allocating the fixed costs to the 
appropriate jurisdictions and services. The FCC has already 
determined that 25% of the NTS local loop costs will ultimately 
be allocated to the interstate jurisdiction. Is this 
appropriate? How much of the remaining 75% should be allocated 
to intrastate toll and how much to local? Or is it necessary to 
allocate the intrastate portion between local and toll? Should 
the toll be allocated between intraLATA and interLATA? These are 
the issues. 
Garfield and Lovejoy consider fixed costs to be demand costs 
or capacity costs. They say •in all, at least twenty methods or 
formulas have been developed for the allocation of demand costs 
to customer classes." C 11) 
Many of the same cost allocation theories and arguments 
similarly apply to cost recovery, that is, who pays and how much 
they pay. This discussion is limited to cost allocation issues, 
and will be followed by a separate cost recovery discussion. 
I will explore four allocation methodologies: (1) usage 
based, (2) stand alone, (3) value of service, and (4) marginal 
cost. 
(1) usage Based Allocation 
With this methodology, allocations are based on the relative 
amount and type of usage over a particular facility. Telephone 
separations, at least in part, considered usage as a criterion 
for many years. As pointed out earlier, a 1913 u.s. Supreme 
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Court case said that allocations should consider the use made of 
the property. The problem with this method, like most methods, 
was it never gave the answer everyone wanted. Interstate 
allocations have been done according to the Ozark plan since 
1971. It embodies the usage concept, but a weighting factor is 
applied. The resulting answer, called the subscriber plant 
factor (SPF} is, on average, about 3.3 times the interstate 
subscriber line usage (SLU). Thus, even though usage is only 
around 8 or 9 percent, approximately 28 percent of subscriber 
loop costs are allocated to the interstate jurisdiction. The 
trend showing the evolution of actual usage versus allocation is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Usage has merit because it is quantitative. It is easy to 
explain and understand. Many products and services today are 
priced according to usage. It has not been workable, however, 
since, in many people's opinion, 
to the interstate jurisdiction. 
it does not assign enough costs 
Even the FCC recognized this 
when it ordered a 25 percent allocation to interstate. 
(2) Stand Alone Allocation 
This concept says if it were not possible to share loops, 
separate networks would have to be built for local calling and 
toll calling. The total cost of the local network is estimated 
and added to the estimated cost of the toll network. A~locations 
are based on the relative ratios of each to the whole. This 
theory was used as early as 1939 in allocating Tennessee Valley 
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Authority (TVA) dam costs to joint activities such as (1) flood 
control, (2) navigation, (3) fertilizer, (4) national defense, 
and (5) developing power. It was called the "alternative cost 
avoidance" theory (Glaeser, 1939, p. 267). 
There are few, if any, local loop costs that are 
specifically for either local or toll calling. This part of the 
network would be built much the same regardless of the service 
provided. Thus, the stand alone cost for each service is roughly 
the same. For example, if we assume the cost to build the local 
network is one unit, and the toll network is one unit, the stand 
alone allocation for each is 1 f (1 + 1) = 50%. Once the 50 
percent allocation to toll is made, the stand alone principle can 
be used again to further allocate the toll to the intrastate and 
interstate jurisdictions. Each would end up with 25 percent of 
the fixed local loop costs, and local service would get 50 
percent. Ironically, this method allocates the same amount to 
the interstate jurisdiction (25%) as the FCC has ordered. 
(3) value of Service Allocation 
The value of service principle means a customer pays in 
relation to the worth of the service to him or her. It has been 
used for many years in pricing local service. The rationale 
there (local service) says the more people one can call, the more 
valuable the service. For example, basic flat-rate local service 
in Pound, Virginia is $9.57. Pound has less than four thousand 
weighted main ter~inals (which are roughly equivalent to 
customers). The same service in Alexandria is $16.48, or seventy 
two percent higher. Alexandria customers can call over one 
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million others. Their service is theoretically more valuable 
than that of a Pound customer who can call less than one percent 
as many. Another example of value of service pricing is business 
rates being traditionally priced higher than residential service 
since a revenue producing business line is ostensibly more 
valuable than a residential line. 
One problem is this method disregards costs when assigning 
rates. Even though rates are higher, the unit or per customer 
plant cost in Alexandria is most likely less than in Pound 
because the high customer density allows (1) less cable per 
customer and (2) finer gauge (less expensive) cable to be 
installed. 
Using value of service as a cost allocation methodology 
requires determining (1) whether local or toll service is more 
valuable, and (2) whether interstate or intrastate toll is more 
valuable. This depends on the calling habits of each customer. 
Local service would be much more valuable to a taxi service, and 
long distance would be more valuable to a nationwide mail order 
catalog business. Thus, it is extremely hard to quantify the 
value of service concept for long distance. One may assume long 
distance service having the potential to call anyone on the 
telephone network is more valuable than service to only one 
particular customer. This is not necessarily true, however, if 
that person is the only one you call. Because of these 
difficulties, value of service is not a good cost allocation 
methodology. 
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(4) Marginal Cost Allocation 
This methodology gets more attention in the context of cost 
recovery (pricing) as opposed to cost allocation. Not 
surprisingly, this paper gives it more coverage there as well. 
As an allocation tool, suffice it to say that marginal cost leads 
one into an endless circle. NTS local loop costs are, for all 
practical purposes, fixed (at least in the short run). (Some 
authorities make rather convincing arguments that local loop 
costs are not fixed and are not non-traffic sensitive. For a 
discussion, see Wilson, 1983.) Therefore, the short run marginal 
cost of making a long distance call (either interstate or 
intrastate) is zero. This implies the allocation to long 
distance should be zero. However, the marginal cost of making a 
local call is also zero, which says no costs should be allocated 
to local. If no cost is allocated to local and none to long 
distance, where does one allocate? Marginal cost, then, is not 
helpful except under the erroneous assumption that the network 
was built for local service and all NTS costs should be allocated 
to local since the marginal cost of toll is zero. (The same 
rationale could as easily prove all costs should be allocated to 
toll.) 
Cost Allocation Conclusions 
From the discussion, it is clear that the two methodologies 
with the most merit are the usage based and the stand alone. 
These are both quantifiable and logical. The value of service 
approach is entirely too subjective since it is impossible to ge~' 
a consensus of all users and all classes of service regarding the 
relative value of each. Marginal cost (at least in the short 
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run) begs the chicken/egg question of which comes first -- local 
service or toll service. It is also impossible to get a 
consensus on that. The two remaining approaches compare 
interestingly·as shown in Table 2: 
Table 2 
Comparison of usage Based and 
Stand Alone Allocation Methodologies 
(Percentages of total NTS local loop costs to be allocated 
to each category) 
Jurisdiction 
Local 
Toll: 
Intrastate: 
IntraLATA 
InterLATA 
Total Intrastate 
Interstate 
Total To1·1 
usage Based(a) 
83.4% 
2.9% 
3.6% 
6.5% 
10.1% 
16.6% 
Stand Alone 
50.0% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
25.0% 
25.0% 
50.0% 
(a)Based on the combined minutes of use of the 5 largest 
Local Exchange Companies in Virginia: Chesapeake & Potomac, 
Centel, Continental, United Inter-Mountain, and General of the 
South. Since these companies serve 97% of the customers in 
Virginia, this is assumed to be representative of a statewide 
average. (Underlying minutes of use data was accumulated by 
Larry J. Cody of the Virginia SCC staff.) 
These two methodologies give a range of allocation 
percentages which could easily be justified. I favor the stand 
alone for several reasons: (1) it is rational (2) it is easy to 
calculate (3) it is inexpensive to calculate (4) it doesn't 
change and (5) it is fair. Further, perhaps by coincidence and 
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perhaps not, the FCC has already determined the allocation to 
interstate is 25% which is consistent with the stand alone 
theory. 
At this point it is not necessary to allocate the remaining 
75% to the various intrastate classes. They are treated as one 
for ratemaking purposes. However, increased toll competition is 
evident, and intraLATA toll may be deregulated in the future (it 
is still regulated but faces competition from resellers). Also, 
there is increased pressure to price services closer to costs. 
All these factors point towards a necessity to further allocate 
intrastate costs between local, intraLATA toll, and interLATA 
toll. For example, if intraLATA competition is allowed (it is 
currently being investigated by the Virginia Commission in Docket 
PUC850036), it will be necessary for local companies to charge 
themselves access charges to originate and terminate intraLATA 
toll calls. They will be competing with the same long distance 
companies that are now their customers, and thus should charge 
themselves the same access charges they charge the long distance 
companies. The stand alone methodology is a reasonable way to 
further allocate NTS local loop costs to the interstate service 
classes. 
Cost Recovery 
Now that costs have been allocated, we must decide how they 
will be paid or recovered. Simply put, who should pay, how much 
should they pay, and how wi 11 they pay? To answer who should 
pay, there are two issues: (1) which classes of service should 
pay (e.g., toll or local), and (2) which customers within each 
class of service should pay (e.g., end users or long distance 
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companies)? After identifying who should pay, it is important to 
decide how much each should pay. Once this is determined, we 
must consider the method of payment, that is, whether it should 
be a flat rate, based on usage, or other. 
In considering who will pay we first must decide over which 
classes of service or nproductsn the recovery (revenue 
requirements) will be spread. There are four: (1) local 
service, (2) intraLATA toll service, (3) interLATA (intrastate) 
toll service, and (4) interstate toll service. As a point of 
clarification, costs were allocated to njurisdictionsn (i.e., 
interstate versus intrastate), but now the revenue requirements 
will be spread over, and recovered from, generic classes or types 
of service (i.e., interstate toll versus intrastate toll) which, 
not unexpectedly, parallel the jurisdictions. Another .Point of 
clarification, for simplicity I will refer to intrastate 
intraLATA service as •intraLATA•, intrastate interLATA as 
ninterLATAn and interstate as •interstate". 
The second step in deciding who will pay is identifying the 
customers within each generic class of service. For local 
service, there are local customers. Of course this could be 
further segregated into residential and business, but for sake of 
simplicity, we will consider local customers as one. The second 
type of customer is the intraLATA toll customer. The third is 
interLATA toll and the fourth is the interstate toll customer. 
These are all end users. (We could say there are only local and 
toll customers, but further segregating toll is consistent ,with 
the way we allocated costs. Also, long distance rates may vary 
{ 
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and in fact are different for most companies in Virginia for 
intraLATA, interLATA, and interstate toll.) 
For the interLATA and interstate toll classes of service 
there is one other customer of special significance, that being 
the long distance companies. They are customers of the local 
exchange companies, and the service they receive is called 
access, that is, access to the end user customers who originate 
and terminate toll calls. Since they receive a service furnished 
over the jointly used local loop, the long distance companies are 
also candidates to pay for the local loop. 
Of course, long distance companies have the option to build 
their networks directly to end users. In some cases they already 
have, especially for high usage customers. This is called "local 
exchange" bypass (opposed to "carrier" bypass when the customer 
builds its own private network and avoids both the local and the 
long distance carrier). It is impractical, however, for long 
distance companies to extend networks to reach all customers. 
They would have to duplicate that which the local companies 
already have in place. Thus, it is more economical and more 
logical for them to reach their customers through local 
companies' networks. The local companies offer this service to 
the long distance companies and charge •access" for it. 
Long distance companies argue the "access" should work in 
the opposite direction. That is, the local companies should 
offer "access" service to end users so they can interconnect with 
the long distance companies. The end user customers, they say, 
should pay •access" to the local companies instead of the long 
distance companies paying it. In the end, of course, the same 
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customer is going to pay. Either the end user pays the local 
company direct for access, or the end user pays the long distance 
company indirectly for access. In the latter case, the access 
charges (paid -to the local company by the long distance company) 
are an expense of doing business and are built into long distance 
rates. 
The point of all this is to identify five candidates to pay 
for local loop non-traffic sensitive costs: (1) local service 
customers, (2) intraLATA toll customers, (3) interLATA toll 
customers, (4) interstate toll customers, and (5) long distance 
companies. All are receiving a service and something of economic 
value, so all should pay. 
How much should each pay? As pointed out ear 1 ier, the FCC 
demonstrated that it really doesn't matter how much cost is 
allocated to the interstate jurisdiction if it is all paid by end 
users and none by interexchange carriers. Taking it to the 
extreme, you could theoretically allocate all NTS local loop 
costs to the interstate jurisdiction and recover all through flat 
monthly charges to end users. Therefore, the answer to this 
question is critical. 
It is a classic rate design question. We know the revenue 
requirement (which equals costs determined from the cost 
allocation process plus a fair return) and we know who should 
pay. Now we must decide how much of the revenue requirement'~ach 
customer (or class of service) must pay. In doing this, I wilY' 
discuss six cost recovery or rate design theories: (1) usage 
based (2) value of service (3) stand alone (4) revenue based (5) 
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market based and (6) marginal cost. The first three and the last 
look very familiar. They are the same as the cost allocation 
methodologies previously examined. Thus, it is possible to 
apportion revenue requirements using the same theory used for 
allocating costs. 
(1) usage Based Recovery 
The basic premise here is the same as in the usage based 
allocation discussion. That is, those using a service should 
pay for it in proportion to how much they use it. If for 
example, 10% of total usage is interstate toll (See Table 3), 
then 10% of NTS local loop revenue requirements should be 
recovered through interstate toll. 
Class of Service 
Local 
Toll: 
Intrastate: 
IntraLATA 
InterLATA 
Total Intrastate 
Interstate 
Total Toll 
Table 3 
Osage Based Recovery 
by Class of Service 
Recovery based on Usage 
(%of Total Revenue Requirements)(a) 
83.4% 
2.9% 
3.6% 
6.5% 
10.1% 
16.6% 
(a>see Table 2 for reference to the source of these percentages. 
Unfortunately, for two classes of service (interLATA toll and 
interstate toll), this does not answer the question of which 
customer within the class should pay (end users or long distance 
companies). This will be discussed later. 
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(2) value of Service Recovery 
Similar to value of service cost allocations, this says the 
more valuable the service, the more recovery should come from 
that service. Ergo, business rates historically have been 
roughly double residential rates. As I will discuss later in 
marginal cost recovery, economists say this is inefficient since 
it artif ically supresses business calling and stimulates 
residential calling. It may be possible to get away with value 
of service pricing in a regulated world where there is no 
competition. Introduce competition and one will quickly see 
bypass if the rate is too high. Also, it is very subjective to 
quantify the precise value using this method. Is local service 
more value than interstate toll? For some it may be and for 
others it may not. 
(3) Stand Alone Recovery 
The same theory applies here as it did in stand alone 
allocation. Thus, access charges to interexchange carriers 
would be priced to recover 25% of the total revenue requirements 
from interstate toll and 12.5% from interLATA toll. The 
remaining 62.5% would be recovered through local rates (50%) and 
intraLATA toll rates (12.5%) (see Table 4). 
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Table 4 
Stand Alone Recovery 
by Class of Service 
Stand Alone Recovery 
Class of Service 
Local 
Toll: 
Intrastate: 
IntraLATA 
InterLATA 
Total Intrastate 
Interstate 
Total Toll 
(% of Total Revenue Requirements) 
50.0% 
12.5% 
12.5% 
25.0% 
25.0% 
50.0% 
Again, as in usage based recovery, this method does not say 
whether interLATA toll and interstate toll recovery should come 
from end users or long distance companies. 
(4) Revenue Based Recovery 
This recovery principle says future recovery should come 
from the same customers in the same proportions as in the past. 
It gives no weight to whether past methodologies were correct or 
whether changing conditions exist. It has merit, nonetheless, 
when a transition is necessary to move from one plan to another 
radically different one to avoid abrupt changes that could force 
customer dislocations. 
(5) Market Based Recovery 
The idea here is to see what the competitive market will 
bear, as long as prices are above costs. Competitiors in this 
market are the end user customers, the IXC customers, and the 
LECs. The competing service is bypass. If recovery is excessive 
from certain customers, they will bypass. For example, if · ·~ 
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excessive recovery comes from end users, they may build their own 
private networks to bypass the LECs. That is a signal to 
regulators and companies to reduce prices. The goal is to seek a 
market determined price that is above costs and low enough to 
prevent uneconomic bypass. The inherent danger is it may take 
bypass to prove rates are too high. Once bypass occurs, it is 
unlikely the customers will return, especially where the customer 
(either interexchange carriers or end users) builds its own 
network. 
(6) Marginal Cost Recovery 
This theory is important since it considers which customer 
within a class of service should pay. I will use this in 
attempting to answer whether end users or long distance companies 
should pay for local loop NTS recovery in the interLATA and 
interstate toll classes of service. 
According to Kahn, (1970, p. 65 & 66), if economic theory is 
to have any relevance to public utility pricing, equating price 
and marginal cost must be the starting point. He says: 
••• marginal cost is the cost of producing one more 
unit; it can equally be envisaged as the cost that 
would be saved by producing one less unit. Looked at 
the first way, it may be termed incremental cost •••• 
Observed in the secon~ way, it is synonymous with 
avoidable costs •••• Cl ) 
Economists argue that efficient competitive pricing would 
have prices equal short-run marginal costs. The problem is first 
identifying marginal costs, and second segregating short-run from 
long-run marginal costs. Kahn (1970, p. 71) says 
causal responsibility is the key to defining marginal costs. 
That is, the person who causes an additional unit of a commodity 
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to be produced and purchased should have to pay for the 
incremental cost of that unit. Conversely, the incremental cost 
of that unit is the marginal cost. At the surface, it appears 
easy to segregate short-run costs from long-run costs. For 
example, a short-run cost would include the material and 
production costs to manufacture one more unit of a product. The 
cost to expand or replace the production facility would not be a 
short-run cost unless that unit couldn't be produced without 
expansion or replacement. Any fixed costs would not be 
considered short-run marginal costs. In the long run, however, 
all costs are variable and thus marginal. A deeper look reveals 
several problems, especially in telephone utility pricing. Is 
depreciation a short-run marginal cost? Since it is typically 
the second highest operating expense (next to maintenance), it 
would be suicidal to ignore depreciation in telephone pricing. 
However, no accountant or engineer would agree that depreciation 
is a short-run marginal cost. It is a fixed cost. So it seems 
dangerous to argue prices should equal short-run marginal costs 
thereby ignoring the second highest operating expense. Kahn gets 
around this (1970 p. 72) by arguing depreciation is a variable 
cost since wear and tear on equipment varies with use. Service 
lives of today's technology equipment are largely a function of 
economic life due to obsolescence and not wear and tear, however. 
I point this out to illustrate the economic principle of setting 
price equal to marginal cost is somewhat ambiguous in telephone 
pricing. 
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Non-traffic sensitive local loop plant is (arguably) a 
fixed, as opposed to variable, cost in the short run. Therefore, 
its short-run marginal cost is zero, and this theory says there 
should be no charge to interexchange long distance companies for 
using this plant to originate and terminate calls. As Kahn 
points out, "Access costs are incurred when the subscriber 
subscribes -- not to interstate service, not to intrastate 
service, not to local service, but to the availability of any and 
al 1 of these." Cl4) He says (1982, p. 4) the Smith I 11 inoi s Bel 1 
Supreme Court decision arrived at an economically false 
proposition that interstate usage should bear some of the non-
traffic sensitive costs. Thus, he agrees (and applauds) the FCC 
philosophy and goal that these costs should not be assessed 
against long distance companies but should be levied directly on 
subscribers in a lump sum monthly charge for the availability of 
local, intrastate toll, and interstate toll. 
Kahn (1982) makes a very appealing argument in favor of 
using marginal cost pricing for telephone service. He says local 
rates have been subsidized by toll for many years because toll 
rates are priced to include recovery of NTS costs. Further, it 
is wrong to recover costs that do not vary with usage (local loop 
costs) in usage charges (toll rates). He says (this was in 1982 
so the prices are dated but the point is still applicable): 
••• people seem to believe that if something is 
regulated it can defy the principles of economics: the 
same people who may be paying $15 - $25 per month for 
cable TV, Home Box Office, and the like seem to regard 
a $6 - $10 rat~ for unlimited local calling as a God-
given right. <15 > 
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He also calls for deaveraging and unbundling: 
There's no reason why the people being served in 
existing service areas by existing drop lines, should 
be subsidizing the people who are causing the system to 
incur new, higher costs of access to the network.Cl6) 
••• by putting the burden of access charging on the 
operating companies, on the basis of their own, 
individual costs, the (Consent) Decree clearly 
encourages de-averaging ••• whi~h is also the direction 
economic efficiency dictates. (17) 
Thus, the marginal cost pricing theory would have the long 
distance companies pay none of the NTS local loop cost, and the 
end users pay all. The person with "causal responsibility" gets 
the tab. In theory it sounds good, but it overlooks several 
critical points. First, telephone service, unlike electric, gas 
and other utilities, is two-way. Its value lies both in being 
able to make as well as receive calls. In fact, more value is 
probably placed in making calls which sharply contrasts with 
other utility services where you only receive electricity, etc. 
Telephone pricing has traditionally been designed by averaging 
and bundling to make the service affordable to all. The more 
people to call and receive calls from, the better and more 
valuable the service. If one customer's marginal cost is very 
small, it doesn't accomplish anything to deaverage and unbundle 
to make that customer's service cheap if others' service becomes 
prohibitively expensive. If others drop off the network and the 
first customer has no one to call, the value of his service is 
not much. This gets back to the "value of service" pricing 
theory. Of course there are exceptions where a customer may wish 
to make and receive calls from only one other customer or a 
limited number of customers. A typical example would be the 
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internal. calling needs of a business with several locations. 
However, the vast majority of customers, I believe, desire to 
have the capability to make and receive calls from virtually 
everyone. Strict marginal cost pricing would not allow this. 
Second, marginal cost pricing would permit the economic 
falacy of allowing someone to get something of value and pay 
nothing for it. There certainly is value for a long distance 
company in being able to have its calls originated and terminated 
without having to extend its network to interconnect directly 
with end users. 
For these reasons, I conclude the marginal cost economic 
premise that end users should pay all NTS local loop costs and 
long distance companies should pay none is flawed. The long 
distance companies should pay some if not all NTS local loop 
costs allocated to the interLATA and interstate jurisdictions. A 
close analogy to this situation is a shopping mall or an airport. 
Both of these have common areas such as enclosed walkways, 
lounges, restrooms, etc. that are largely fixed costs. These 
areas are used jointly by customers going to the stores in the 
mall or by airline passengers. The marginal cost of that 
customer or passenger using the common area is zero (except for 
minor cleaning and maintenance). Therefore, the store customers 
and passengers are not charged a flat fee to enter the mall or 
airport. These fixed costs are recovered through the rent 
charged to the stores and airlines, and are passed on to 
customers in the cost of merchandise and plane fares. The 
jointly used area can be thought of as the local loop, and the 
stores and airlines are the long distance companies. It is 
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illogical to expect customers to buy tickets to enter a mall or 
airport. This would deter usage. It is equally illogical to 
expect telephone customers to pay local loop recovery in the form 
of a segregated flat rate charge. Instead the local companies 
should charge rent to the long distance companies. In turn, this 
would be built into prices of the LEC's merchandise -- toll 
calls. 
The next question asks how the payment should be made. The 
most obvious forms are through fixed rates, uniform usage rates 
declining block or variable usage rates, or a combination of all. 
The underlying economic principle here, I believe, is to develop 
a rate schedule that has an incentive to promote usage and 
efficiency. The flat rate does this best. Present local service 
usage of over 80% (which for the most part is based on flat 
rates) is a prime example. (In fact, some argue this service has 
been over-promoted to the point of being economically 
inefficient.) The uniform usage rate is less desirable. If more 
calling means paying more at the same rate (for example, at 4.5 
cents per minute), the less incentive there is to call. The 
declining block variable usage rate encourages more calling or at 
least rewards more calling by giving lower rates or volume 
discounts for high usage. Therefore, the preferred pricing 
scheme would be to use flat rates, variable usage rates, or a 
combination of the two. Since NTS local loop costs are fixed 
costs in the short run, it seems logical to recover these costs 
through fixed or flat rate charges. 
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Cost Recovery Conclusions 
The original questions were: (1) Who should pay, (2) How 
much should each pay, and (3) How will they pay? From the 
foregoing discussion, we can conclude that (1) recovery for NTS 
local loop costs should come from local service, intraLATA toll 
service, interLATA toll service, and interstate toll service. 
The end user customers of the first two service classes should 
pay. For the last two, long distance companies should pay some, 
if not all, of the costs allocated to those jurisdictions. The 
amount of the payment depends on the revenue requirements 
assigned to each class of service. The two most logical 
assignment methods are (1) usage based and (2) stand alone. The 
I ~ form of payment should be flat rate. 
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RESULTS OF STUDY 
With this theoretical and sometimes opinionated discussion 
behind us, I will now present a practical evaluation of the 
various allocation ·and recovery alternatives using empirical 
data. These results are designed to give zone-of-reasonableness 
answers and are not intended to be exact. They are rough 
estimates at best. Many assumptions were made, but the results 
give an accurate portrayal of the issues (with the potential risk 
of being over simplified). 
Remember the present allocation and recovery guidelines: 
o Allocation of NTS local loop costs is frozen at 1983 
Subscriber Plant Factor (SPF) levels. This averages 
28% nationwide. 
o The interstate allocation will move (up or down) 
towards 25% for each company over 8 years. 
o Current interstate recovery comes in part from a 
carrier common line usage charge of 4.33 cents per 
minute of use paid by the long distance companies to 
the local companies. 
o The rest of the interstate recovery comes from a 
flat monthly subscriber line charge paid by end users. 
It equals $1 for residential and single line business, 
a maximum of $6.00 for multi-line business, and $2.00 
for Centrex. 
First I will look at this issue from a national perspective. 
The estimated 1985 NTS local loop revenue requirement is $35.6 
Bil 1 ion per year. (Goldberg, 1986, p. 1) This equals 
approximately $310 per line or $25.80 per line per month. Column 
(1) of Table s shows how this is presently recovered. Column (2) 
shows the recovery assuming costs are allocated and recovered 
based on usage. Column (3) assumes allocation and recovery based 
on stand alone costs. Column (4) assumes 25% of the costs wi~l 
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be allocated to the interstate jurisdiction (as the stand alone 
theory would do and the FCC will do over 8 years). Recovery from 
long distance companies is based on usage. For interstate, the 
difference between the 25% cost allocation ($8.9B) and the usage 
recovery ($3.6B) is recovered through the SLC ($5.3B). For the 
75% intrastate allocation ($26.7B), long distance companies pay 
the usage based CCLC ($1.3B) and the residual ($25.4B) is 
recovered from local and intraLATA toll. 
Table 5 
Nationwide HTS Local Loop Recovery Analysis 
($ Billions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Recovery 
Source 
End Users: 
Usage Baf 
Present<a>usage<b>stana<c>with 25~ 
Recovery Based Alone Allocate 
Intrastate 
Local, Toll,(d) & SLC(e) 
Interstate 
SLC 
End User Subtotal 
Long Distance Companies: 
Intrastate 
InterLATA Toll (CCLC) 
Interstate 
Interstate Toll (CCLC) 
Long Distance Company Subtotal 
Grand Total 
Intrastate Subtotal 
Interstate Subtotal 
Grand Total 
21.0 
2.4 
24.2 
3.1 
8.3 
11.4 
35.6 
24.9 
10.7 
35.6 
30.7 22.3 
0 0 
30.7 22.3 
1.3 4.4 
3.6 8.9 
4:9 13.3 
35.6 35.6 
32.0 26.7 
3.6 8.9 
35.6 35.6 
(a)Present Recovery data is from J. J. Goldberg's "Recovery of 
Interstate NTS Revenue Requirements: Current and Projected 
Results" (b)Based on percentages in Table 3. 
(c)Based on percentages in Table 4. 
(d)IntraLATA Toll (e)Most states, including Virginia, do not have an intrastate 
SLC. 
25.4 
5.3 
30.7 
1.3 
3.6 
4:9 
35.6 
26.7 
8.9 
35.6 
As 'shown in Table 6, moving from the present condition to a 
Usage Based plan (Column 2) would shift $6.5B to end users 
(about $4.70 per line per month), which is not an unbearable 
amount. It would also shift $7.lB from the interstate to the 
intrastate jurisdiction. In doing so, revenue requirements to 
long distance companies would reduce $6.5B or 57%. Using the 
current interstate CCLC of 4.33 cents per minute as a base, this 
rate would fall to 1.86 cents. [(l - .57) x 4.33) 
Moving from Column (1) to a Stand Alone plan (Column 3) 
would decrease end user revenue requirements by $1.9B. However, 
$1.SB would shift to the intrastate jurisdiction, and long 
distance company revenue requirements would increase $1.9B. The 
CCLC would increase to 5.05 cents. This could be a problem if 
long distance companies are correct in saying existing CCLC rates 
are inducing uneconomic bypass. 
A shift from existing to a usage Based Recovery with a 25% 
interstate allocator (Column 4) would increase end user revenue 
requirements the same as moving to Column 2 ($6.5B or $4.70 per 
line per month). However, $2.9B of the $6.SB will come from the 
interstate SLC. Thus, intrastate local rates will only have to 
absorb $3.6B or $2.60 per line per month. The long distance 
companies get the same $6.SB reduction (1.98 cents CCLC) and only 
$1.SB additional revenue requirements shift to intrastate. The 
advantages of this plan are very appealing. 
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Table 6 
Nationwide NTS Local Loop Recovery Analysis 
Changes from Present Recovery 
($ Billions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
usage Bai 
Recovery Present usage Stand With 25~ 
source Recover:t Based Alone Allocate 
End Users: 
Intrastate 
Local, Toll & SLC 0 8.9 o.s 3.6 
Interstate 
SLC 0 { 2. 4) { 2. 4) 2.9 
End User Subtotal () 6.5 (1.9) 6:5 
Long Distance Companies: 
Intrastate 
InterLATA Toll {CCLC) 0 { 1. 8) 1.3 (1.8) 
Interstate 
Interstate Toll (CCLC) 0 (4.7) 0.6 (4.7) 
Long Distance Company Subtotal () (6.5) 1.9 { 6. 5) 
Grand Total 0 0 0- 0 
Intrastate Subtotal 0 7.1 1.8 1.8 
Interstate Subtotal 0 (7.1) (1.8) (1.8~ 
Grand Total 0 0 0 0 
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CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are two cost allocation and cost recovery techniques 
that have merit. They are the (1) usage based and (2) stand 
alone. A comparison follows: 
usage Based 
o Allocates more costs to intra-
state than stand alone and more 
than existing 
o Recovers more from End users 
than stand alone and more than 
existing 
o Recovers less from long 
distance companies 
o Has no End User SLC 
o Recovers all interstate costs 
from long distance companies 
o Interstate recovery would 
be less than existing 
o Intrastate InterLATA recovery 
would be less than stand 
alone and less than existing 
Stand Alone 
o Allocates less costs to 
intrastate than usage based 
and more than existing 
o Recovers less from end users 
than usage based and less 
than existing 
o Recovers more from long 
distance companies 
o Has no End user SLC 
o Recovers all interstate costs 
from long distance companies 
o Interstate recovery would 
be less than existing 
o Intrastate InterLATA recovery 
would be more than usage 
based and more than existing 
Using a usage based allocation and recovery method would 
appear to be the most objective and logical approach. However, 
this perhaps unnecessarily shifts significant revenue 
requirements to the intrastate jurisdiction and the end users. 
On the other hand, a stand alone allocation and recovery plan 
would require increased recovery from long distance companies, 
most likely through higher carrier common line charges. This 
approach is at odds with the current trend to reduce these 
charges. I suggest it is appropriate to adopt a range of 
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recovery· with usage as one extreme and stand alone as the other. 
The optimum level within the range would be determined by 
competitive market conditions. 
Unfortunately, however, a range with this variance is not 
all that helpful for the near term problem at hand. Therefore, I 
suggest a more narrow range that would be bounded by existing 
recovery on the upper end and usage based recovery with a 25% 
interstate allocation at the lower end. Again, optimal rates 
would be determined by market conditions (as discussed on pages 
31 and 32) within this range. There are several advantages. 
First, this would require minimal changes to existing procedures. 
Part 67 of the FCC rules (cost allocations) would not have to be 
altered. Only Part 69 (cost recovery) would require change. 
Second, present recovery from long distance companies would be 
frozen. Therefore, if there truly is a bypass problem (and this 
has not yet been proven conclusively), it would not be made 
worse. Third, the usage based recovery with a 25% interstate 
allocation is extremely attractive as it is a hybrid of the stand 
alone allocation method and the usage based recovery method. It 
combines the advantages of both by having the long distance 
companies pay their fair share determined by usage without 
shifting additional revenue requirements to the intrastate 
jurisdiction. The disadvantage is it shifts additional revenue 
requirements to end users in the form of higher Subscriber Line 
Charges (slightly more than double present recovery) and it 
increases revenue requirements for local and intraLATA toll by 
roughly 16%. However, this is a worst case scenario. It is 
entirely possible that market conditions would support higher 
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recovery from long distance companies without significant bypass. 
Bypass could be easily monitored by looking at the usage trends 
from year to year. If total minutes of use increase at a stable 
rate, it is unlikely bypass is a problem. However, if minutes of 
use decline, bypass is a likely cause. 
A variation of this proposal would be to treat originating 
and terminating minutes of use differently. Since bypass most 
easily and frequently occurs on the originating end, the 
originating CCLC rate could be reduced towards the lower end of 
the range (usage based). Since most customers wish to have the 
capability to call •the world•, it is much more difficult to 
bypass on the terminating end of the call. Accordingly, the 
terminating CCLC rate could be kept at present levels. The FCC 
in fact recently issued guidelines that freeze the terminating 
CCLC at the present 4.33 cents per minute rate, and allow the 
originating rate to decline. 
Concerning the form of recovery, I believe local companies 
should be given pricing flexibility that would stimulate usage. 
The preferred choice would be for the local companies to charge a 
flat rate •rent• to the long distance companies for use of the 
local loop. This rent could be renegotiated yearly or even 
monthly if conditions warrant. It could be calculated using the 
previously discussed parameters. That is, it would be market 
driven within a predetermined range. The second choice would be 
to continue a usage based recovery rate but institute volume 
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discounts or tapered rates to induce usage (preferably in off 
peak periods). The least preferred option is to continue the 
uniform CCLC. 
In conclusion I emphasize there is not a single correct 
answer in the·world of separations and access charges. This 
field is in a state of permanent change. I trust in this paper I 
have given insight to the history of the problem, the theory of 
current issues, as well as offering a workable plan for the 
future. 
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